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Abstract 
In its comprehensive meaning, citizenship should ideally bestow a sense of belonging in 
the large social group, as well as a stake in the state’s cultural, political and economic life, 
topped by a sense of solidarity, which transcends ethno-religious differences. 
Unfortunately, many nation states fail these tasks and not all of their citizens are offered 
such an embracing welcome. Because of the massive immigrations of the last decades this 
difficulty has intensified and many states struggle with the problem of maintaining a 
sense of belonging of its citizens with the state. This article proposes a named new 
concept, “Citizenhood”, which may provide a better way to reconcile ideas of cultural and 
social rights with the idea of citizenship in contemporary multicultural liberal and 
democratic nation states. In particular, the new concept strives to alleviate the situation of 
groups upon whom citizenship does not confer the sense of ‘being at home’. Improving 
the feelings of these groups is important not only for their own well-being, but for the 
state as well, since their feeling of alienation from the community at large weakens social 
cohesion and may fuel continuous tensions. Scholars have suggested different alternatives 
to overcome these difficulties but a solution is not yet in sight. This paper discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of previous suggestions and elaborates on the benefits of 
the proposed new concept.  
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Introduction 
In recent decades, western countries have been experiencing a growing international 
migration, which challenges the previously homogeneous nature of many nation states and 
intensifies inner tensions (Geddes 2016). This reality has put multiculturalism theory and 
politics into question (Malik 2015), and it seems that despite ongoing attempts by scholars of 
political philosophies, a solution to the complex issues of citizenship and multiculturalism 
has not been found yet.  
The idea of citizenship in a democracy has gradually evolved over the last centuries 
from membership in a political community (Abowitz and Harnish 2006) into a multi-
dimensional concept. The contemporary concept of citizenship includes the imposition of 
various obligations, combined with civil, political and social rights, such as those required to 
guarantee individual liberties, political participation, and the basic resources for living with 
dignity (Marshall 2006) in a community, nation state or other collectivity (Yuval-Davis 
1999). In recent decades, however, the original purpose of citizenship to prevent society’s 
division into privileged and unprivileged has been transformed into an instrument of social 
bordering, exclusion and hierarchy (Yiftachel 2016b). Nowadays, it is often used in an 
exclusionary way, differentiating between those who are entitled to certain rights and those 
who are not (Joppke and Morawska 2014). For many years, the concept of citizenship lacked 
reference to substantive issues of cultural belonging (Delanty 2002). However, being a citizen 
in its comprehensive meaning, should ideally bestow a sense of belonging in a social group 
(Amit and Bar-Lev 2015). Belonging, as Yuval-Davis (2006) states ‘is about emotional 
attachment, about feeling “at home”’ (p. 197), and there is an extensive involvement of 
emotions in the issue of citizenship and the way it is constructed (Jones 2005; Mookherjee 
2005; Zembylas 2013). Citizenship should provide a sense of familiarity and safety, as well 
as a stake in the state’s cultural, political and economic life, in its plans and visions for the 
future and in its achievements and failures, topped by a sense of solidarity — a term that 
conveys ‘attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation and mutual support in time of need, 
which transcend ethno-religious differences’ (Banting and Kymlicka 2015, p. 5), and ‘an 
ethic of membership’ that is the foundation for social justice (p. 4).   
Unfortunately, in many nation states, not all citizens are offered an embracing 
welcome. Some, usually historic or immigrant ethnic and national minorities,1 are not invited 
by the majority to share this sense of belonging. Taylor (1998) asserts that this is an inherent 
paradox of democracies, whose inclusive nature of a government of all the people creates a 
necessity of a high degree of cohesion. This need leads to artificial calls for unity, in which 
citizens – usually those belonging to the majority – are encouraged by political leaders and by 
other citizens of their own group, to feel differently towards different groups of citizens in the 
public domain, based on their gender, race, ethnicity or religion, allowing ‘effective 
citizenship’ to impact the construction of full citizenship rights (Johnson 2010). Exclusionary 
practices deeply affect historic national minorities, as well as immigrant minorities, who are 
                                                          
1 Historic national minorities (Kymlicka 2011) are sometimes called Indigenous. In the case of the discussion 
here, the former better expresses unique national identity of historic minorities.   
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also typically not included in the majority’s definition of the character of the nation state, 
despite their identification with their receiving country. While the formers’ national feelings 
are usually seen as a threat to the nation state, the latters’ are often treated by the majority as 
infiltrators who came to exploit the state’s resources (Koopmans 2010). Yet another 
marginalized group exists, that of citizens and minorities who feel alienated from what the 
state stands for and even object to and resist the state’s values. All these minority groups are 
thus living with a constant sense of being an unwanted stranger in one’s own home.  
For the state, both types of marginalized groups are problematic as their exclusion 
weakens social cohesion and may fuel continuous tension and struggle over the cultural and 
national character of the state and its public sphere. It is important to stress that while the 
state should attempt to create a sense of belonging for all its citizens, it cannot force any of 
them to share this feeling, and should accept Taylor's (1997b) principle of ‘deep diversity –
allowing different levels of linkage to the state, without denying citizens of their rights based 
on their sense of belonging.  
Scholars have suggested different alternatives to solve to this tension. But, as will be 
discussed later, further thinking and additional ideas are still required to find a way to 
overcome the animosity and estrangement between different ethnic and cultural groups who 
live in the same state, struggling to determine its character and nature.  
This paper draws on previous suggestions and proposes a new named concept 
‘Citizenhood’ substituting the suffix ‘ship’ with ‘hood’ thus conveying a sense of belonging 
to a body of persons or a particular character or class. This new concept and adhering to what 
it stands for, may resolve some of the above mentioned tensions or at lease hold them in 
balance. This idea suggests creating an additional overarching identity (or super-identity) that 
embraces all members of society, without requiring them to waive their distinct identities; a 
superordinate identity that extends the boundaries of the collective, to which all citizens can 
develop a sense of belonging. Without belittling the importance of the name (which is 
significant), there is more to Citizenhood than just a name change. Citizenhood is a whole 
new concept that requires novel attitudes and actions by the government, the citizens, the 
academia and social groups. In what follows the paper elaborates on how this concept may 
provide an improved way to reconcile ideas of cultural and social rights with the idea of 
citizenship in contemporary multicultural liberal and democratic nation states.  
After discussing, in Section 2, the tensions over ownership of the public sphere in 
divided societies, the paper analyses in Section 3 the existing alternative solutions. The 
novelty, advantages and dilemmas of the Citizenhood concept are described in Section 4. In 
this section the paper also deliberates the difference in treatment of non-liberal minorities and 
the issue of historical national minorities. Discussion and conclusions are set out in Section 5.  
2 Struggle over ownership of the public sphere 
In recent decades, in an attempt to resolve issues related to minorities’ status and collective 
rights, cultural rights have become a recognized element of citizenship in democratic states 
(Kymlicka 1995; Rosaldo 1997; Parekh 2000). A fundamental principle of such 
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multiculturalism is that an individual’s identity is tightly connected to her group’s collective 
identity, as this is the source from which individuals derive their ideas of what is appropriate 
for them to be (Taylor 1997). Isaiah Berlin (1969) described the right to be a part of a 
culturally independent group as the ultimate recognition, without which the individual may 
doubt her status as ‘a fully independent human being’ (p. 23). ‘For what I am’, Berlin wrote 
‘is, in large part, determined by what I feel and think; and what I feel and think is determined 
by the feeling and thought prevailing in the society to which I belong’ (p. 23). Based on this 
understanding, there is a wide consensus nowadays that cultural minority groups should be 
allowed to lead their lives and raise their children according to their particular cultural 
practices and norms, as in the absence of this option minorities are forced to choose between 
assimilation into the majority or living on the margins of society (Kymlicka 1995; Tamir 
1998)2. Collective rights, though, are not enough to solve the issue of belonging. Since the 
nation state model remains the most viable of all, despite predictions of its ‘extinction’ 
(Iglesias, Stojanović, and Weinblum 2013; Yiftachel 2016), we must explore ways to enable 
minorities to share a sense of belonging in the collective ‘cultural intimacy’ (Herzfeld 2014) 
without losing their independent identity. This is extremely important, as in most countries, 
nationwide solidarity is typically fragile, if not receding (Banting and Kymlicka 2015), which 
weakens acceptance of minorities into the ‘we-ness’ of the majority.   
One of the salient obstacles to the challenge of creating a reality in which all groups can 
feel ‘at home’ is the reluctance of each group to waive its desire to dominate the public 
sphere and specifically, the state’s symbols and ambiance. Sometimes, as will be discussed 
later, a minority may try to change the country's mentality and way of life completely, 
imposing its own norms and symbols on the majority. Usually, however, it is the majority 
who wants to control the state’s character, while refusing to give the minorities any foothold 
in its formulation. Examples of such situations include the debate in European countries over 
the Muslim niqab and the ban over wearing it in public (Fernando 2010; Moors 2009) and the 
gap between the law and actual state of Arabic language in public communication in Israel 
(Saban and Amara 2002). In both cases, the majority rejects the cultural presence of the 
minority – whether immigrant or national historic minorities – in the public sphere due to a 
sense of discomfort or fear of losing dominance. In such a reality, although members of 
minorities are considered equal citizens, it is impossible for them to feel as if they belong to 
the state; instead, they feel like unwanted, merely tolerated, guests in their own home.  
3 Is there a solution in sight?  
In the introduction to his book Blood and Belonging, Michael Ignatieff (2010) discusses the 
common belief that only national self-determination can satisfy such a sense of belonging. A 
similar idea is that of belonging to ‘fundamental cultural groups’ (FCGs), which Mautner 
defines as groups that regulate comprehensive and profound aspects of their members’ lives 
and provide answers to existential questions such as ‘What is the meaning of life?’ ‘What life 
is it appropriate to live?’ ‘What is the meaning of evil, suffering, and causality in human 
beings’ lives?’ ‘Is there a God?’ and ‘Is there life after death?’ (2008, p. 283). Based on the 
                                                          
2 The risk of legitimizing oppressive practices of non-liberal groups, which is entailed in collective rights will 
be dealt with below. 
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breadth and depth of such regulation, Mautner (2008) suggests that people attribute far 
greater importance to their belonging to an FCG than to any other identity group to which 
they may belong, such as gender or profession. In Ignatieff's view, though, belonging can 
also be satisfied by what he calls civic nationalism, a sense of belonging to a community of 
citizens with equal rights who share a set of political practices and values rather than blood 
(or FCG) relations. Such a sense of belonging, Ignatieff (2010) says, creates a form of ‘civil 
patriotism’ that is more democratic than national patriotism, because it encompasses all 
citizens. 
Ignatieff himself doubts the likelihood of this idea’s realization in practice, as he 
recognizes the fact that nationalist sentiment typically overrides all other forms of belonging, 
including family and friends, grounded in the belief that one cannot be protected unless one 
has a nation to protect him/her. Nationalist sentiment is further fueled by the impact of 
collective memory, especially in large groups with collective trauma in their past (Volkan 
2001, 2004), as is the case in some of the majority and some of the minority groups. Such 
groups tend to believe that their sovereign nationality is their only protection against 
existential threats that constantly await them (Keynan 2015a, 2016). Moreover, Ignatieff's 
civil nationalism can be expected to increase the exclusion of and intensify the conflict with 
totalizing communities (Coser 1974 cited in Walzer 2005), which rejects democratic and 
liberal values altogether, and whose pious observance overrides all other forms of belonging, 
including close family, with the same ferocity as nationalistic sentiments. At the same time, 
in cases where these communities are considered part of the national majority, such as the 
Haredi (ultra- orthodox) community in Israel or evangelist communities in the US, they may 
join forces with the same majority whose democratic civic identity they reject, to exclude 
ethnic immigrants or historic national minorities. The liberal center thus faces a two-fold 
challenge: one vis-à-vis the ethnic/national minorities and one vis-à-vis the non-liberal 
totalizing communities. 
The question is, therefore, whether it is possible to create a civic identity that is more 
inclusive, promotes solidarity and a sense of belonging (Banting and Kymlicka 2015), and at 
the same time does not require waiving either the separate value systems or the national 
statehood. The idea is to facilitate an additional, overarching civic identity, which includes 
both the totalizing orthodox groups and the historic national and immigrant minorities, but 
does not impose a choice between the original sub-group and the overarching identity. The 
issue of totalizing groups and the issue of historic national groups are allegedly two separate 
issues, but often, especially in multination states, the former includes also the latter.  
To promote social cohesion in diverse and ‘multinational’ societies, Kymlicka focuses 
on the relations with the ethnic/national minorities, suggesting  a ‘multination federalism’ 
with two main features: ‘a federation of quasi-federal sub-units in which the minority group 
forms a local majority, and can thereby exercise meaningful forms of self-government’ 
(2011, p. 6), and recognition of the minority’s language as an official state language. While 
recognizing the minority’s language is worth having and feasible, it alone does not solve the 
problem, as is well reflected in Israel, where Arabic is an official language but most Jewish 
Israelis do not acknowledge it as part of their citizenship or even of Israeli public 
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communication (Saban and Amara 2002). The other element of Kymlicka’s suggestion may 
work under what he calls ‘favorable conditions’, one of which is the territorial concentration 
of the historic national minority. Even where this condition exists, there is no guarantee that a 
multinational federation will solve ethnic conflicts, as scholars have shown that ethno-
federalism or autonomy arrangements have rarely worked when challenged by severe 
nationalist divisions (Roeder 2012). Furthermore, multinational federalism offers no solution 
to those ethnic/national minority citizens who wish to belong to the majority. In fact, it may 
even worsen their position – under a quasi-federal arrangement that offers local self-
government, the majority may feel released from any obligation to include the minority 
citizens while the zealous members of the minority may consider such integrative aspirations 
as a betrayal of their own ethnic group. Federalism is also incapable of meeting the 
challenges posed by religious totalizing communities, which are often geographically 
dispersed, and frequently attempt to disseminate their beliefs among the non-pious majority, 
hoping to gradually impose their way of life on additional sectors of society.  
4 Citizenhood – the concept and its dilemmas 
This is where the idea of Citizenhood comes in. The notion of Citizenhood suggests that the 
state recognizes a multilevel civil identity of its citizens, not merely as a legal status, but as 
an intrinsic part of its overarching identity, which embraces all members of society equally, 
regardless of their distinct identities. The main difference between Citizenhood and other 
theories of equal citizenship, including collective rights to all groups, is the development of 
an overarching civil identity. Citizenhood does not settle for accepting otherness by the 
majority, nor for welcoming minority members to join the majority’s identity. It calls for 
facilitating and nourishing a top layer of a comprehensive national identity that comprises the 
diverse identities of the different groups, but does not replace them nor make them redundant. 
The idea is that the state acknowledges and legitimizes the preservation of one’s national or 
other fundamental cultural identity, as part of one’s additional, superordinate identity to 
which all citizens can develop a sense of belonging. Being an overarching identity – 
recognized by the state – it may replace the inherently combative majority-minority power 
relations, with a new formula of belonging.  
Citizenhood combines and expands on several concepts, taking them one step further to 
create a multilevel civil identity and sense of commitment. Its main goal is to enable citizens 
as individuals and as groups to preserve their cultural and national tradition and belonging, 
while at the same time to belong to the broader circle of citizens, sharing aspirations for 
freedom and hope for all, and for a country with greater civic achievements – economic and 
cultural prosperity, a high-achieving educational system and better quality of life. A belief 
that such achievements are possible will enable all groups to feel pride over their country, an 
important notion for accomplishing and improving civil and moral goals (Rorty 1998). This 
concept requires more than the removal of all institutional obstacles that prevent individual 
members of minorities from integrating in the majority if they so desire (Barry 2001; Fraser 
2000); and more than granting collective rights to cultural minorities who wish to preserve 
their separate culture and tradition (Kymlicka 1995, 2003, 2011). It requires a political-
cultural-educational effort that adopts Rorty's (1989) view of a diverse community, joined 
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together by an ethos of resistance to suffering, while developing a tradition of aspiring to 
freedom and hope despite a history of conflicts and struggle. Developing such a tradition 
entails the inclusion of historical and cultural heroes, which used to represent conflicting 
groups but are accepted as representing a society that overcame inner conflicts and to which 
therefore all citizens can develop a sense of belonging. In a way, this is an expansion of the 
collective memory of the state, to include the memories and narratives of all its groups 
(Keynan 2015b). As Fraser (2000) showed, excluded groups tend to accentuate their 
difference as part of their struggle to be accepted as equal. The option of ‘different and alike’, 
of being ‘who you are’ as a member of a sub-group, and at the same time a legitimate, 
accepted part of the whole, and an equal representative of whole, reduces animosity and 
moderates the need to emphasize differences on the expanse of solidarity. Such a process 
does not require the abolition of one group’s narrative in favor of the other, but enables, with 
time, acceptance of all of them, one next to the other.  
The main barrier to Ignatieff's idea of civil patriotism lies, as he himself puts it, in the 
strength of national sentiments. Since Citizenhood does not require the abandoning of 
membership in one’s own national or other fundamental group, it may increase the likelihood 
that this notion will promote a closer cooperation between people who believe in liberal 
democratic ideas but belong to different religions or FCGs. Citizenhood’s concept of 
legitimizing the existence of multiple identities, while embracing them under the overarching 
identity of the state, may work also based on Rawls’s concept of overlapping consensus. 
Rawls states that while there is no one comprehensive doctrine of justice, which is accepted 
by all, ‘in a well-ordered society3 the political conception is affirmed by … a reasonable 
overlapping consensus’, which is supported ‘by the reasonable though opposing religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines’ (2001, p. 32). This idea can be used metaphorically in the 
concept of citizenhood, as the different large groups in a nation state may agree on the 
principle of multilevel identities, although the reasoning for accepting this concept may stem 
from different perspectives.  
The problem of totalizing non-liberal sub-groups 
Granting collective rights to non-liberal sub-groups poses a dilemma to liberalism as a theory 
and moral practice that rejects oppression. Allowing non-liberal communities to apply 
oppressive practices in the name of liberalism’s own values of tolerance, diversity and 
multiculturalism, creates an obvious internal contradiction. The main risk, however, is the 
power it gives to non-liberal FCGs to deny their own members access to human rights based 
on cultural autonomy (Jones 1999). This may turn Citizenhood, just like any theory of 
collective rights, into a two-edged sword: On one hand, liberal values negate the imposition 
of these same liberal values upon non-liberal minorities, while on the other hand, they stand 
the risk of legitimizing oppressive practices of non-liberal groups (Barry 2001; Fraser 2000), 
thus abandoning their members to repression.  
                                                          
3 Kymlicka (2017) challenges Rawls’s argument that in developing a theory of justice we may assume that the 
world is divided to territorially bounded polities that have settled their boundaries disputes beforehand. This 
methodological dispute does not change the ideas of this paper.   
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Looking for a solution to these risks, Kymlicka (1998) suggests that collective rights 
should be granted on the condition that group membership is a matter of self-identity, which 
is not imposed by the state or by the group itself; that no group may violate the basic human, 
civil or political rights of their members; and that individuals are free to question and reject 
any inherited or previously adopted identity, if they so choose, and exercise an effective right 
of exit from any identity group. The Citizenhood concept adds to Kymlicka’s crucial 
conditions. It gives members of non-liberal groups the option of multi-level identity, which 
may empower them to materialize Kymlicka's conditions. The option to belong both to the 
sub group and to the overarching identity may help to relax the fear of becoming displaced, 
torn off the community one chose to exit with no identity to cling to.  
Totalizing non-liberal sub-groups refuse to educate their children and youth to the basic 
ideas of the liberal-democratic state. This practice creates two additional problems: those who 
grow up in these communities are usually unaware of their options under Kymlicka's 
conditions or the value foundation of liberal theories; being unaware of the basic rules of 
democracy, which they may delegitimize, some of these groups use their comparative 
autonomy and political representation to impose part of their values on the entire country. 
Confronting this dilemma, Walzer (2005) claims that the democratic state has a right to 
educate all its future citizens on the meaning of citizenship and democratic values, in order to 
ensure continuity of its values, and therefore totalizing communities should not be exempt 
from civil education. This may alarm totalizing communities that wish to preserve their 
segregation and separation from other communities. Supporting Walzer's view, the 
Citizenhood concept may help to reduce totalizing communities' objection to such a move. 
The fact that Citizenhood is based on multilevel identity that accepts different FCGs may 
ease the pressure of totalizing communities to change the character of the state, as they will 
be less pressured to assimilate, and perhaps more interested in keeping a modus vivendi with 
the liberal state (Tamir 1998). Achievement of this goal entails walking a very fine line and 
establishing a delicate balance between the right of all groups – including fundamentalist and 
totalizing groups – to cultural continuance, and the fact that such rights are only available in 
liberal-democratic societies (Walzer 2005). In other words, since liberal-democratic societies 
are no less entitled than non-liberal groups to preserve and reproduce themselves, they should 
be permitted to avoid self-destruction committed in the name of their own essential values. 
This dilemma echoes Emanuel Levinas’s ethics of the ‘other’. In his book Humanisme de 
l'autre Homme (1972), Levinas rejects any preference of one culture over another. At the 
same time, however, he considers multiplicity without universalism as ad absurdum of 
indifference, abandoning the other to her fate. The vulnerability of the face of the other, says 
Levinas, exposes the responsibility of the self towards an unfamiliar other, guiding both to 
search for orientation which is lacking in cultural relativism (Chalier 1999). The Citizenhood 
concept adheres to Levinas' view of responsibility for the other, as represented in multiplicity 
combined with universalism.  
The issue of historic national minorities 
Historic national minorities usually do not feel connected to the nation state. In a 2003 survey 
by the UK Home Office (cited in Kymlicka 2011), only several percent of Irish Catholics in 
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Northern Ireland identified themselves as belonging to Britain, in contrast to some 86% of 
Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi immigrants and white British. Similarly, in Israel, the 
historic national Palestinian minority considers itself excluded by the state’s official 
definition as a national Jewish state (Agbaria, Mustafa and Jabareen 2015) and therefore does 
not feel Israeli. These emotions stem from these minorities’ past sovereignty in the territories 
that are now ruled by the state. Their national sentiments notwithstanding, these minorities 
deserve collective and individual rights, as well as the right to equal citizenship, and to the 
individual choice of whether to embrace a sense of belonging to the state. The majority in a 
nation state, however, may intentionally exclude these minorities, not only from belonging 
but also from equal citizenship, fearing minorities’ aspirations for independence (Kymlicka 
2011). Thus, even when these minorities are granted equal citizenship and citizen rights, they 
are generally excluded from the ‘we-ness’ that the majority shares, and therefore they never 
feel at home. Exclusionary practices increase the minorities’ resentment toward the majority 
and the nation state, which they see as an illegitimate force that deprives them of their 
cultural and national independence and identity. In a vicious circle this resentment 
strengthens the exclusionary practices and so on and so forth. Multiculturalism theories have 
tried to temper this tension by suggesting different versions of collective rights with or 
without territorial or non-territorial autonomy (Kymlicka 2011; Malloy, Osipov & Vizi 
2016). While all these suggestions attempt at improving minorities relations with the 
majority, making their life less marginal, they do not bring a realistic option of integrating 
them into the comprehensive entity of the state. The Citizenhood concept, on the other hand, 
by suggesting an overarching top level to a multilevel identity, allows all the existing 
identities in the country to become one whole without negating the preservation of their 
independent identity. This practice leads to mutual responsibilities of the state and the historic 
national minorities, and suggests an answer to what Kymlicka (2017) defines as the question 
of ‘what states can rightfully demand of minorities’ (p. 2). When the state offers minorities 
coexistence of their separate and shared identity, it can more rightfully ask them to see 
themselves as full members in the multicultural state. 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Multicultural theory has not yet solved the problem of otherness and the denial of belonging 
from minorities. Even where the nation state grants members of minorities full and equal civil 
and cultural rights, such rights are often granted reluctantly and are not accompanied by 
genuine emotional and social acceptance by the majority. This situation usually emerges also 
within ‘cultural liberalism’ – where the state does not impose its nationality on those who do 
not share it, grants certain group-specific rights or policies (as long as they operate within 
certain constraints of liberal justice), and at the same time allows individuals from these 
groups to freely express and cherish their own national identity (Kymlicka 1998). 
Emotionally based excluding practices keep marginalizing minorities, pushing them to a 
status of ‘tolerated guests’, excluded from a sense of belonging and the safety of being ‘at 
home’.  
The Citizenhood concept addresses this problem, by transcending the notion of 
‘respecting the other’ to casting off minorities’ otherness, while enabling them to remain who 
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they are. According to the Citizenhood concept, both the majority and the minority FCGs 
share a super ordinate layer of characteristics and general rules, that creates a shared top layer 
of identity. On the one hand, Citizenhood calls for pluralism that acknowledges the right of 
all groups to conduct their lives according to their particular culture, tradition, habits and 
norms. On the other hand, it tries to prevent the state from being a collection of isolated 
communities, and supports Walzer's (1990) idea that pluralism without universalism is 
devoid of meaning, and ruins the possibility of critically analyzing non-pluralistic attitudes 
such as radical nationalism and sexism (Sarid 2009).    
Citizenhood is not a simple solution. It requires sophisticated and detailed political 
decentralization arrangements based on an agreed constitution (Mautner 2011), while 
preserving both the rights of minorities and those of the majority. This may seem utopian. 
Nonetheless, inevitable difficulties notwithstanding, reconciling conflicting fundamental 
identities under an overarching identity is possible, as evinced, for example, by efforts in 
Israeli and Palestinian civil society groups, especially among members of bereaved families. 
With personal trauma as their common denominator, groups such as The Parents’ Circle4 and 
Combatants for Peace5 have assumed an overarching shared identity as grieving victims of 
the Palestinian-Israel conflict, in addition to rather than instead of their rivaling national 
identifies. They have demonstrated how, by assuming this top layer of shared identity, they 
are able to work together to prevent both nations from suffering the consequences of the 
conflict in the future (Keynan 2009).  
The work of groups such as these is a source of hope. If reconciliation is possible 
among individuals who have lost their loved ones to the conflict, it should be possible for 
sub-groups of citizens in democratic countries to harmonize their relations under a shared 
overarching identity. Such an endeavor certainly requires serious, honest and courageous 
efforts by the leaders of all the country’s sub-groups. Unfortunately, the likelihood that 
political leaderships would lead such an effort is quite low, as in situations of conflict, it is 
the more aggressive leaders that come to the fore and attain power (Fisher 2006). Political 
leaders typically prefer to exacerbate intergroup conflicts as a mechanism to strengthen their 
leadership (Pittinsky and Simon 2007; Keynan 2009). Civil society leadership on the other 
hand is less limited by political considerations, debts and interests and therefore may be a 
more promising candidate to lead such a project.  
The concept of Citizenhood builds on the the fact that individuals and groups have ‘as 
many identities as [they have] relations with other individuals, groups, or social sites’ and 
that they ‘shift from identity to identity as they shift relations’ (Tilly 2015, p. 9), and uses it 
as a leverage to alleviate inner conflicts between citizens who wish to remain loyal to their 
distinct cultural and natural groups and yet become part of the larger group's identity and 
aspirations. Having an overarching identity to which all belong, strengthens the state’s social 
contract between all citizens as equal members in this alliance of individuals and 
                                                          
4 Palestinian-Israeli Bereaved Families for Peace, http://www.theparentscircle.com/  
5 Combatants for Peace, http://cfpeace.org/?lang=he  
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communities in their shared home, the state, thereby also encouraging cooperation between 
the different segments of society to promote joint interests. 
The majority may feel threatened by this concept, fearing it might limit their own wish 
to realize their nationhood in their national state. One should remember, however, that 
researchers of multiculturalism have continuously claimed that the majority’s cultural 
dominance is happening unaffectedly, by the natural course of the majority's choices 
(Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka 2003; Tamir 1998). Just like any community, as long as the 
majority members imagine their cultural/national community (Anderson 1983) as the one 
they wish to belong to (Renan 1996), they will be able to attain their dominance simply 
because of their number. Citizenhood does not prevent the majority from preserving its 
national feelings, nor the state’s representation of its symbols, though it does require room to 
present additional cultural symbols in the public sphere. Perhaps the best way to describe 
Citizenhood from the majority's standpoint is that instead of undermining other groups' 
national and cultural identities and emotions, it regulates the relationship between all groups, 
allowing a combination of symbols. This concept echoes Kymlicka's suggestion (2011) of 
multination federalism, but offers instead a multi-identity federalism, whose borders are not 
territorial. Instead of federal managerial arrangements it contains ‘federal’ identity, which 
similar to territorial federalism enables each group to preserve its identity, uniqueness and 
cultural life while conforming with the democratic values of the state. The members of each 
cultural group may live wherever they choose, identify themselves as belonging to this or 
other community according to their own choice, and change their identity if they so choose. 
This may calm down the struggle over dominating the state’s center and public sphere, and 
allow a sense of solidarity that extends the boundaries of each group. Promoting an inclusive 
national identity may even strengthen the pride of all groups in their state, as a moral society, 
a necessary condition for continuous effort for national improvement (Rorty 1998).  
To embrace all those who wish to belong to an inclusive citizenship, a nation state must 
satisfy three conditions: prohibition of the exclusion of minority groups from the legitimate 
civil partnership in the ‘we-ness’ of the majority, prohibition of oppression of individuals by 
their own totalizing groups, and defense of liberal-democratic values. The Citizenhood notion 
is capable of satisfying all three conditions, provided that the defining rules apply equally to 
all members of the polity. These rules prohibit the exclusion of minorities by eliminating all 
barriers to full integration for individuals who so choose (without forced assimilation); grant 
collective rights to minority groups, eliminating obstacles to cultural and educational 
activities; and facilitate a superordinate civil identity by creating an atmosphere of inclusive 
citizenship. At the same time, however, these rules also prohibit non-liberal minorities from 
imposing oppressive practices on their own members, and limit the extent of these groups’ 
political power to change laws that reflect fundamental liberal-democratic laws. 
While supporting Taylor's (1997b) concept of ‘deep diversity’, Citizenhood addresses 
also the other side of Kymlicka's (2017) question, cited above, of ‘what states can rightfully 
demand from minorities’. In other words, the Citizenhood concept considers all individuals 
and groups of citizens as both equal and as part of the overall identity of the state, while 
asserting that this status allows both sides to demand reasonable reciprocity in their relations.  
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Table 1 provides a concise summary comparison between Citizenhood, citizenship and 
some of the more important above-mentioned theories and suggestions that have been 
forwarded to resolve the conflicts that arise due to multiculturalism. The theories that the 
table addresses are listed on the first row of the table, and the issues that are needed to be 
solved are listed in the first column. Each cell provides an assessment of whether or not, and 
to what extent, the theory in the corresponding column resolves the issue in the 
corresponding row. For lack of space each theory is identified in this table by just one author, 
even though several might have shared the idea; I usually named the earliest author to come 
up with the idea. 
With seven theories and 16 issues there are quite a few comparisons to be made. In 
principle however, one observes from Table 1 that Citizenhood is better suited to resolve the 
problems concomitant with multiculturalism than the other theories. It provides a concrete 
named concept which projects a sense of belonging, whereas the other concepts might be 
somewhat nebulous. Citizenhood is the only concept that unites all minority groups under one 
overarching identity with which they could identify, except for groups of totalizing minorities 
(for which nobody has a solution). But the paper provides suggestions of how Citizenhood 
could even somewhat alleviate tensions between these groups and the majority. All theories 
assume that there are some groups that are less attached to the state and that the state must be 
tolerant towards them in some way. Citizenhood on the other hand posits that all groups 
belong to the state, but each in its own manner. 
All the suggested theories are not yet feasible and are subject to opposition by the 
majority groups in the states and by the politicians. The majority might be suspicious 
concerning how the proposed arrangements would affect their power to dominate the public 
sphere. Politicians, as mentioned above, are not entirely opposed to majority-minority 
conflicts since such conflicts could become a useful tool to enhance their leadership in a time 
of contesting political power struggles. These politicians would not welcome measures that 
would limit the conflicts. Citizenhood however outlines a way whereby its adoption could 
become a win-win move for both the majority and the minority groups. Hopefully these 
groups would have enough influence on politicians to induce them to embrace this concept.  
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Table 1 
Citizenhood compared with citizenship and alternative theories advanced to resolve multicultural issues in nation states 
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1998 
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collective 
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Concrete concept Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Somewhat 
Creates an overarching identity to all citizens Yes No No No No No No 
Provides minorities collective rights Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Provides minorities individual rights Yes Yes Yes Yes Not 
necessarily 
 
Yes Yes 
Provide a sense of belonging to all Yes (but 
totalizing 
minorities 
may resent 
it)  
No No No No No Only to 
liberal 
minorities 
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Imposes a choice between the original sub-
group and the national identity. 
No Yes Possibly Yes Yes Yes Not on 
liberal 
groups but 
Yes on 
non-liberal 
groups 
 
Promotes social cohesion Yes No No No No No Somewhat 
Prevents society's division into privileged and 
unprivileged 
Yes No No No No No Not on 
liberal 
groups but 
Yes on 
non-liberal 
groups 
 
Could become an instrument of social 
bordering, exclusion and hierarchy 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
To non-
liberal 
groups 
 
Could lead to harmful artificial calls for unity 
of the majority 
No 
 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Somewhat 
Allows liberal minorities  to lead their lives 
according to their particular cultural practices 
and norms 
Yes 
 
 
 
Somewhat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Eases tensions between the majority and 
minority groups with traumatic past  
Yes No Somewhat No No Not 
addressed 
Not 
addressed 
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Allows totalizing  minorities  to lead their 
lives according to their particular cultural 
practices and norms 
Yes, but only 
to the extent 
they do not 
conflict with 
human rights 
Somewhat Yes Yes, but 
only to the 
extent 
they do 
not 
conflict 
with 
human 
rights 
Yes, but 
only to the 
extent they 
do not 
conflict 
with human 
rights 
Not 
addressed 
Not 
addressed 
Eases the exclusion of and conflicts with 
totalizing communities 
Yes No Somewhat Somewhat Yes Not 
addressed 
No, may 
increase 
such 
tensions 
Feasibility Not 
negligible, 
but requires 
work 
Yes 
 
Doubtful Yes Doubtful Yes Doubtful 
Example of partial success Yes, in some 
few cases 
(shown 
above) 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
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